Approved For Release 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP75-00149R0007005000008-0

ST. LOUIS, MO. POST-DISPATCH

E-344,575 8-569.578

APR 1 1 1966

## Lodge Being Blamed for Crisis, have to listen to the little man In Viet Nam; He Is Said to Have Agreed to Dismissal of Gen. Thi

Ambassador Took Calculated Risk, have advised Lodge that the Reportedly Received Faulty Intelligence From Own Staff and CIA

## By RICHARD DUDMAN

A Staff Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

SAIGON, South Viet Nam, April 11 > AMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE is being blamed for firing Thi as First Corps coma serious political blunder that set off the current political crisis—the firing of Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi.

There are mitigating circum- They recognized Thi as stances. Antigovernment demon- popular leader, a brave, capable the move. planned, and this ouster mere- Buddhist organization centered ly provided an unexpected ex- at the University of Hue. They cuse. Also, Premier Nguyen emphasized his reputation for Cao Ky is said to have done the acting in accordance with his i job ineptly, sending Thi back to his stronghold in Hue instead of putting him out of action.

Nonetheless, Lodge acquiesced in a calculated risk that turned out to have been badly mis-

The facts are these, sources! here report:

LODGE, like his predecessor, little use for Thi. Both considered him to be overly ambitious and a troublemaker.

A different view of the young South Viet Nam. general was held by many Amerand at his home at Hue.

strations already had been commander and a figure able; beliefs.

When others were merely talklead an attempted coup. He fled to Cambodia when Diem outmaneuvered the rebel forces. Thi remained, in exile three maker rather than a popular

TO SOME, Thi seemed to be a potential Ramon Magsaysay, the magnetic Filipino who led his Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, had country to victory over the Hukbalahap insurgency. Most recognized, however, that Thi never would be acceptable to Catholics or southerners in faction-ridden

American sources seemed to agree that Thi was harsh and of the Viet Namese First Corps interrogation. He often gestures with a pointed forefinger and

cocked thumb to show that he

He acted as a warlord in his domain of Da Nang and Hue, CIA3-63 Vethan sometimes refusing to recognize orders from Saigon and dismissing civilian officials appointed by the central government.

THE HONOLULU conference aggrandized Premier Ky and, observers think, deepened the rivalry of Gen. Thi's part.

When Ky went to Da Nang after the Honolulu meeting for a conference with leaders there, Thi is said to have made scorn-I ful remarks such as, "We don't gon."

The Honolulu meeting is thought to have given Ky the impression that he was strong enough to dispose of Thi at last.

At the American Embassy, the serious repercussions. The Central Intelligence Agency is said to have given similar advice as well as a warning that Communists were responsible for part of the trouble with Thi, a view not widely shared.

KY SPOKE with Lodge before the 10-man ruling "directory." Lodge did not advise against

The two men had a long discussion in which Lodge is said to have gone over the advantages and disadvantages and avoided any recommendation of his own.

What went unrecognized was that the Buddhist leaders could ing against the dictatorship of use the move as an occasion for Ngo Dinh Diem in 1960, Thi demonstrations against the military government.

> More important, Thi was regarded as an individual troublefigure expressing resentment of his entire region against the government in Saigon. The feeling had been growing that the First Corps was doing most of the fighting and paying heavy taxes, yet was being treated like a stepchild by Saigon.

> SOME OBSERVERS point out that the South Viet Namese more than the Americans should have been aware of the regional splits and animosities.

Now another general from the same region, Ton That Dinh, has been named First Corps commander, apparently, with concurrence of the Buddhist leaders.

Thi no longer is an issue, but strong, with no end in sight.

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